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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we will assess the performance of a
data-driven anomaly detection algorithm, the In-
ductive Monitoring System (IMS), which can be
used to detect simulated Thrust Vector Control
(TVC) system failures. However, the ability of
IMS to detect these failures in a true operational
setting may be related to the realistic nature of
how they are simulated. As such, we will investi-
gate both a low fidelity and high fidelity approach
to simulating such failures, with the latter based
upon the underlying physics. Furthermore, the
ability of IMS to detect anomalies that were pre-
viously unknown and not previously simulated
will be studied in earnest, as well as apparent de-
ficiencies or misapplications that result from us-
ing the data-driven paradigm. Our conclusions
indicate that robust detection performance of sim-
ulated failures using IMS is not appreciably af-
fected by the use of a high fidelity simulation.
However, we have found that the inclusion of a
data-driven algorithm such as IMS into a suite of
deployable health management technologies does
add significant value.
1 INTRODUCTION
In preparation for the launch of Ares I-X, a data-driven
anomaly detection algorithm was deployed as part of a
suite of several software tools for inclusion in a ground
diagnostics prototype to support detection and diagno-
sis of potential anomalies or failures during the pre-
launch phase. The selected data-driven anomaly detec-
tion algorithm, IMS (Inductive Monitoring System), is
based on incremental clustering, and operates with a
semi-supervised anomaly detection paradigm, as de-
fined in previous work (Chandola et al., 2009). This
implies complete reliance on training data of only the
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nominal class. As such the training data is implic-
itly labeled, and there are no labels for the anomalous
class. The clustering is performed in an unsupervised
manner, and any monitored data points falling outside
of the clusters are flagged as anomalous. Detailed de-
scriptions of how IMS performs anomaly detection are
provided in previous work (Iverson, 2004), (Iverson et
al., 2009), (Martin, 2010).
Due to the lack of available nominal and fault data
with which to validate and test the algorithm for Ares
I-X, data from the Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Sys-
tem from previous Space Shuttle missions was used.
The data collected served two purposes: as nominal
data, and fault data which was constructed by seed-
ing nominal data with failures of various types, sever-
ity, and fidelity for subsequent validation and testing.
However, the ability of IMS to detect true failures may
possibly be influenced by the realism of how they are
simulated and subsequently tested. As such, a signif-
icant portion of this paper will be dedicated to inves-
tigating a computationally efficient approach to sim-
ulating such failures, and observing the effect of the
increased fidelity on detection performance, extending
what was presented in previous work (Martin et al.,
2010).
IMS was one of several data-driven anomaly de-
tection tools that were evaluated for inclusion as
part of the suite of technologies to be demonstrated
during the Ares I-X test launch, which included
both model-based and rule-based technologies. Data-
driven algorithms are just one of three different types
of algorithms that were deployed, the details of
which were presented in previous work (Iverson et
al., 2009), (Schwabacher and Waterman, 2008) and
(Schwabacher et al., 2010a). The other two types
of algorithms that were deployed include a “rule-
based” expert system, and a “model-based” system.
Within these two categories, the deployable candi-
dates were selected based upon their flight heritage
and system certifiability. For the rule-based sys-
tem, SHINE (Spacecraft Health Inference Engine)
(James and Atkinson, 1990) was selected for deploy-
ment, which is used within two components of BEAM
(Beacon-based Exception Analysis for Multimissions)
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(Mackey et al., 2001). Other components of BEAM
include various data-driven algorithms. BEAM is a
patented technology developed at NASA’s JPL (Jet
Propulsion Laboratory). SHINE serves to aid in the
management and identification of operational modes.
For the “model-based” system, a commercially avail-
able package developed by QSI (Qualtech Systems,
Inc.), TEAMS (Testability Engineering and Mainte-
nance System) was highlighted in work subsequent
to its debut (Cavanaugh, 2001), and was selected for
deployment to aid in diagnosis. In the context of
this particular deployment, distinctions among the use
of the terms “data-driven,” “rule-based,” and “model-
based,” can be found in the previously cited paper
(Schwabacher and Waterman, 2008). In the final de-
ployed software package, we integrated TEAMS with
IMS in the Ares I-X Ground Diagnostics Prototype
(GDP) by running the two in parallel and displaying
the outputs of both tools on the same console, and we
used SHINE to provide the inputs to TEAMS.
In this effort, it is of great importance to provide for
a robust and accurate detection of a variety of known
fault modes that span a number of different rates of
progression and severity. However, this capability is
already well-provided for by other model-based tools
(i.e. TEAMS) within the suite of deployed tools. IMS
should be able to detect these, as well as unknown
faults or anomalies that otherwise may have not been
modeled from a top-down, or data-driven perspective,
rather than a bottom-up, or model-based perspective.
A review of the resulting performance of the entire de-
ployed package has also been provided (Schwabacher
et al., 2010a), (Schwabacher et al., 2010b). Other re-
lated work covering similar topics is also available in
the literature (Iverson et al., 2009), (Park et al., 2002),
(Pisanich et al., 2006), (Rao et al., 2009).
Some advantages that IMS has over the model-
based and rule-based algorithms include the fact that:
1. It has the ability to detect anomalies that were
previously unknown and not previously simulated
or accounted for.
2. It has the potential to detect anomalies that are
precursors of faults before a model-based system
detects the fault.
3. It does not require a labor-intensive modeling
process.
The disadvantages of IMS compared with model-
based tools are:
1. It does anomaly detection only, not diagnosis, so
that additional analysis is necessary to determine
whether a detected anomaly is significant or not.
2. It only provides an acceptable level of accuracy if
it is trained using a sufficient quantity of historical
and/or simulated training data.
In previous work (Martin, 2010), we studied three
candidates to provide the primary role of data-driven
anomaly detection, which included IMS. Of the three
algorithms tested, it was found that IMS was the best
performing algorithm when considering both over-
all accuracy as quantified by the area under the Re-
ceiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC),
and computational complexity. In this paper we aim to
follow up with more detail on the performance of IMS
in its designated primary roles as specified above, ex-
ploring both its advantages and disadvantages. In do-
ing so, we will demonstrate that the other model-based
and rule-based technologies with which IMS was de-
ployed provided certain capabilities which IMS com-
plemented well in some cases, while in other cases,
the performance of IMS was less than desirable due to
inappropriate use.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 will provide a detailed description of
all simulated failures to be tested, including the higher
fidelity version based upon physics. Section 3 provides
a comparative discussion of the performance of IMS
as it relates to the ability to robustly detecting simu-
lated failures of varying fidelities. Section 4 will pro-
vide a general discussion of the selection of IMS as the
data-driven anomaly detection algorithm, selection of
parameters, training, validation & testing procedures.
Both quantitative and qualitative performance results
for Shuttle and Ares I-X data at the pad and at the Ve-
hicle Assembly Building (VAB) will also be discussed.
Section 5 provides a comparative discussion of the per-
formance of IMS, and the model-based detection and
diagnostic tool, TEAMS. The final concluding section
will provide an overall summary and epilogue.
2 SIMULATED FAILURES
Historical Space Shuttle data was used to test the en-
tire Ares I-X ground diagnostic prototype. The Space
Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) TVC is virtually
identical to the Ares I-X first-stage TVC, so the SRB
TVC data was expected to be very similar to the Ares
I-X TVC data. Similarly, the ground hydraulic sys-
tem used with the SRB TVC is virtually identical to
the ground hydraulic system used with the Ares I-X
TVC. These assumptions held up modestly well after
our post-flight analysis, in consideration of all the tools
that were deployed to support failure and anomaly de-
tection. The differences that we found in the data were
caused by differences in operations between Shuttle
and Ares I-X, rather than by differences in the TVC
or HSS hardware.
The SRB TVC and the associated ground hydraulic
system have had very few failures. We thus had avail-
able to us an abundance of nominal data, but very little
failure data. We therefore decided to develop a set of
failure simulations that could be used to test the ability
of the prototype to detect and diagnose failures. We
inserted simulated failures into the historical Shuttle
data, and used the resulting data sets to test the proto-
type before the Ares I-X launch.
Table 1 provides a summary of the failure modes
that we simulated for each vehicle location. In order
to test the integration of the TVC and HSS TEAMS
models, we decided to select one failure mode that
can be isolated to the TVC (Failure Mode 1a, FSM
Leak)1, one that can be isolated to the HSS (Failure
1The Fuel Supply Module (FSM) leak is a N2H4 (hy-
drazine) leak resulting in a pressure drop, and is simulated
within 1 min prior to launch at the pad and within the 34
minute period after the calibration test in the VAB.
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Table 1: Failure Mode Summary
Failure Mode Label Vehicle Location Failure Mode
1a Pad FSM LeakVAB
2 VAB HPU overheat
3 Pad Hydraulic LeakVAB
4 VAB Stuck actuator
Mode 2, HPU overheat)2, and one that would produce
a TEAMS ambiguity group including both TVC and
HSS candidates (Failure Mode 3, Hydraulic Leak).3
In addition, because the actuator positioning test was
considered to be the most important pre-launch test of
the TVC, we decided to simulate a failure during this
test (Failure Mode 4, Stuck actuator).4 We will only
describe failure mode 1a in the remainder of this sec-
tion, as it includes examples of simulations that span
the range of fidelity used for all of the failure modes.
For the remaining failure modes, low fidelity linear
simulations were used and simulated in a similar fash-
ion as the low fidelity version of failure mode 1a. Fur-
thermore, although the motivation for selecting these
specific failure modes were based upon support for
testing and integration of TEAMS models, they also
serve as proving grounds for testing the anomaly de-
tection capability of IMS.
As shown in Table 1, a leak in the fuel supply mod-
ule can be simulated either at the pad or at the VAB.
The leak at the pad was simulated to occur between
Go for GLS Start (at approximately T-31 sec) and Go
for SSME Start (at approximately T-10 sec). The FSM
pressure is simulated to drop to an off-nominal value
instead of nominally staying above a specified thresh-
old.
Similar to the other simulated failure scenarios, an
initial attempt at the construction of the FSM failure
simulation involved the simple use of a linearly de-
creasing ramp, given a predefined rate of degradation
from the nominal operating pressure to an off-nominal
value. This linear simulation was used to support the
ROC analysis performed in a previous study (Martin,
2010). However, it is possible to use a higher fidelity
physics-based simulation for this scenario because all
of the relevant data is available for its construction. A
higher fidelity failure scenario may provide a more re-
alistic test of our algorithm’s ability to detect the fail-
ure in reality. The method used for the same simu-
lated failure occurring at the VAB spans the period of
time during which APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) sys-
tem checks are conducted. Both low fidelity (linearly
2The Hydraulic Pumping Unit (HPU) overheat failure is
an over-temperature failure simulated within a 25 min period
during tests in the VAB.
3A hydraulic fluid leak will result in a hydraulic fluid
reservoir level drop that is simulated within 1 min prior to
launch at the pad and within the 10 minute period after the
calibration test in VAB.
4The actuator is simulated to be stuck during the actuator
positioning test during a 2.5 min test in VAB.
decreasing ramps) and high fidelity (physics-based)
failure simulations for the FSM leak will be used for
analysis of data at both the pad and the VAB to offer
a fair basis for comparison in how fidelity affects fi-
nal performance. This is primarily due to the fact that
differences in detection performance between the VAB
and pad may be due to differences in operational pro-
cedures regardless of simulation fidelity.
The FSM pressure will begin dropping from a nom-
inal value to venting at atmospheric pressure over the
course of a few minutes. As the FSM pressure drops,
the FSM pressure sensor will redline on a low value.
To simulate this failure, we must account for both fluid
phases contained in the FSM, the liquid hydrazine and
the gaseous nitrogen used to pressurize the spherical
tank, such that it is completely voided. The leak in
the FSM will be simulated to evolve according to the
following assumptions:
1. Assume that the geometry of the FSM is estab-
lished according to available documentation.
2. Assume that the liquid hydrazine (N2H4) is filled
only to midpoint of the spherical tank.
3. Assume that the leak is below the surface of the
liquid.
In order to simulate the FSM leak according to
physics, we will also implicitly use all of the as-
sumptions that result from applying the unsteady form
of Bernoulli’s equation as presented in (Munson et
al., 1998) to solve the differential equation shown as
Eqn. 1 associated with the initial leak of the liquid hy-
drazine. Fig. 1 depicts the leak along with some of the
geometrical constants and subscripted reference points
used in Eqn. 1.∫ s2
s1
∂V
∂t
ds =
pg
ρ
+
1
2
[
v21 −
(
v2
Cd
)2]
+ g(h1 − h2)
(1)
pg
!=p0 − pa is the gage pressure in the tank, where p0
is the pressure to which the tank is pressurized with
GN2, and pa is atmospheric pressure. ρ is are the den-
sity of liquid hydrazine, and g represents the gravita-
tional constant. Cd is the coefficient of discharge at
the leak point, and s defines the fluid streamline along
which Bernoulli’s equation is being applied. v1 and
h1 define the velocity and height from the ground to
the top of the liquid hydrazine, respectively. Similarly,
v2 and h2 define the exit velocity and height from the
ground to the site of the leak, respectively.
We assume the sphere has radius r, and the cross-
sectional disk representing the top surface of the liquid
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Figure 1: Fuel Supply Module Schematic and Geometry
hydrazine shown in Fig. 1 has a radius of d. Since we
are interested in unanticipated decreases in the height
of the liquid hydrazine in the tank, let us define h!=h1
as our independent variable to simplify Eqn. 1 for the
one-dimensional case, defined with respect to the ref-
erence +z shown in Fig. 1. Furthermore, we may ap-
ply Eqn. 2 for conservation of mass, and Eqn. 3 defines
the velocity v1 as a function of the height h1. The ideal
gas laws Eqns. 11-12 are defined for constant tempera-
ture (de)pressurizaton, and we assume constant accel-
eration via Eqn. 4. The geometry defined in Fig. 1 and
auxiliary Eqns. 5-10 involve hg , the distance from the
ground to the bottom of the tank, and hr, the distance
from the top surface of the liquid hydrazine in the tank
to the top of the tank. Thus, the simplified version
of Eqn. 1 results in the differential equation shown as
Eqn. 13.
m˙ = ρA1v1 = ρA2v2 (2)
v1
!=
dh1
dt
=
dh
dt
(3)∫ s2
s1
∂V
∂t
ds =
dv1
dt
(h2 − h1)
=
d2h
dt2
(h2 − h) (4)
A1(h) = pid(h)2 (5)
A2 = pid20 (6)
Vg(h) =
pi
3
h2r(3r − hr) (7)
V0 =
2pi
3
r3 (8)
d(h) =
√
hr(2r − hr) (9)
hr = 2r + hg − h (10)
p0V0 = mgRT (11)
p(t) =
p0V0
Vg
(12)
(h2 − h)
(
d2h
dt2
+ g
)
=
1
ρ
(
p0V0
Vg(h)
− pa
)
+
1
2
(
dh
dt
)2 [ (CdA2)2 −A21(h)
(CdA2)2
]
(13)
where d0 represents the radius of the leak area as-
sumed to be a round hole, and R represents the ideal
gas constant for GN2. p(t) and T represent the abso-
lute pressure as the leak evolves as a function of time,
and absolute temperature of theGN2, respectively. A1
and A2 represent the surface areas of the N2H4/GN2
fluid interface and the round hole through which liq-
uid hydrazine is leaking, respectively. V0 and Vg are
the initial volume of GN2 and the volume of GN2 as
the leak evolves, respectively. Finally, m˙ represents
the mass flow rate of the liquid hydrazine (N2H4), and
mg represents the total mass of the GN2 in the tank.
An approximation to the resulting differential equa-
tion can be used to yield a separable nonlinear differen-
tial equation that can be solved in closed form, shown
as Eqn. 14. This approximation is applied by recog-
nizing that the left hand side of Eqn. 13 (quantifying
the gravitational and acceleration terms) is negligible
relative to the right hand side. The gravitational term
is always negligible, and the acceleration term is im-
portant only for quantification of a negligibly small
transient at the very beginning of the leak. Further-
more, constants characterizing the FSM geometry can
be simplified due to the relative sizes of the leak radius
and the radius of the N2H4/GN2 fluid interface (i.e.
d0 " d(h)). The last assumption is that pa " p(t),
which may contribute most to the approximation error
since the tank pressure evolves over time and will not
necessarily always be much greater than atmospheric
pressure. Thus the error may potentially grow over
time as the tank pressure decreases due to evolution of
the leak. However, in general the resulting closed-form
representation will help to relieve the computational
burden associated with numerical methods otherwise
required to solve the differential equation (i.e. a stiff
solver).
dh
dt
≈ −CdA2
A1(h)
√
2p0V0
ρVg(h)
(14)
Note that the negative square root of
(
dh
dt
)2 must
be used in Eqn. 14 in order to yield a real solution.
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Furthermore, by recognizing that dVg(h)dh = −A1(h),
Eqn. 14 can be simplified to Eqn. 15.
V
1
2
g
dVg
dt
≈ CdA2
√
2p0V0
ρ
(15)
Integrating both sides of Eqn. 15 and combining the
result with Eqn. 12, we may now write the resulting
closed-form expression for the tank pressure as a func-
tion of time, p(t), shown as Eqn. 16.
p(t) ≈ p0V0(
V
3
2
0 +
3
2CdA2
√
2p0V0
ρ t
) 2
3
(16)
Simulation of the voiding of the remaining gaseous
nitrogen (GN2) in the FSM is performed by use of a
linear 1st order approximation of a differential equa-
tion governing the release of an ideal gas as used in
(Tchouvelev et al., 2007). The solution of the dif-
ferential equation is shown as Eqn. 17. The mass of
the GN2 was obtained by use of the design condition
(1.1 lbs of gaseous nitrogen at 400 psig as a baseline),
obtained from the seminal paper on the introduction
of the FSM (McCool et al., 1980). It was also as-
sumed that theGN2 underwent a constant temperature
and constant volume ideal depressurization (bleeding
off tank pressure by operating a GN2 pressurization
valve) from this design condition to the nominal value
that existed at the time the leak was simulated when
in the VAB. The constant temperature assumption also
holds for evolution of the leak from the nominal pres-
sure value to p(t) = pa.
p(t) ≈ pve−
(
CdA2
Vv
)
t
√
γ( 2γ+1 )
γ+1
γ−1RT (17)
Of course, when h = h2, the liquid hydrazine will
have emptied out to the point that it can no longer es-
cape from the hole, and only the gaseous nitrogen is
left to escape. We call the pressure at which this occurs
the vent pressure, pv , which can easily be computed
using Eqns. 7, 10, and 12. The time of this event can
be approximated by using Eqn. 16. The corresponding
volume of gas left to be evacuated from the tank is Vv ,
and γ is the ratio of specific heats forGN2. Therefore,
Eqn. 16 governs the release of liquid hydrazine until
the time of the vent pressure. At this point, Eqn. 17
governs the subsequent release of gaseous nitrogen and
complete voiding of the tank at which point p(t) = pa.
3 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In this section we aim to investigate and observe the ef-
fect of increased simulation fidelity on detection per-
formance. In doing so we hope to gain a better un-
derstanding for and develop an appreciation of possi-
ble improved ability of IMS to detect simulated fail-
ures that may be more realistic. In the previous sec-
tion, we have provided the details for how a high fi-
delity, physics-based simulation of a fuel supply mod-
ule leak is to evolve, according to Eqns. 16 and 17.
Using these equations, the time at which the pressure
in the FSM approximately reaches atmospheric pres-
sure associated with the high fidelity simulation can
Figure 2: Time to FSMVoiding for Various Leak Radii
be used to construct the slope of the line associated
with the low fidelity simulation, for a fixed leak ra-
dius. Thus, implicit linearized versions of Eqns. 16
and 17 represent low fidelity simulations. The slope
of the resulting line will determine the rate of degra-
dation, to be used as a fair basis for comparison to the
nonlinear rate of degradation which evolves according
to physics. Fig. 2 illustrates the times to be used to
construct the slopes of low fidelity linear simulations,
based upon various leak radii that were simulated with
the high fidelity physics based simulations.
The detection performance can be quantified by the
Area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteris-
tic) curve (AUC). The ROC curve is a plot of the true
positive rate against the false positive rate, and can
be used to help make the tradeoff between these two
rates. The curve is constructed by treating time points
as representative samples, all of which are implicitly
used to compute the true and false positive rates. The
AUC is loosely a measure of accuracy over all possible
tradeoffs between the true positive rate and the false
positive rate, computed by numerically integrating the
area under the ROC curve. More formally, the AUC
represents the probability that a randomly chosen fail-
ure data point is more suspect than a randomly chosen
nominal data point (Rosset, 2004). An AUC of one
thus indicates perfect ranking of these two randomly
selected data points.
As such, Fig. 3 demonstrates how detection perfor-
mance varies across a range of leak radii for both the
high and low-fidelity simulations of FSM leaks, using
Shuttle data at the pad as the sole exemplar. Detection
performance using Shuttle data from the VAB is poorer
than that at the pad due to reasons to be described in
Sec. 4. These reasons are also specific to the FSM leak
failure mode 1a, but otherwise performance using the
VAB Shuttle data exhibit the same tendencies as per-
formance based upon using data from the pad.
Two main observations can be made regarding Fig.
3. First, it is evident that robust detection performance
improves as the leak radius increases, as quantified by
the AUC, regardless of the simulation fidelity. This
meets with intuition, since a faster leak should be more
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Figure 3: High vs. Low Fidelity Simulation Detection
Performance
easily and quickly detectable. The second observa-
tion relates to the fact that the detection performance
of both the high and low fidelity simulations converge
as the leak radius increases. This also meets with in-
tuition, since a faster leak can be more easily approxi-
mated in a linear fashion. However, as we can tell from
the error bars, there is quite a bit of overlap between
the high and low fidelity simulation methods for fast
leaks, and even for slow leaks. Thus, there is no appre-
ciable difference between the detection performance
results for the low and high fidelity simulations, and as
such we will not make the distinction between the two
for the remainder of the paper.
4 ANOMALY DETECTION
As mentioned previously, IMS works under the prin-
ciple of semi-supervised anomaly detection by build-
ing a model of the nominal historical data on which
it is trained. Because IMS only models the nominal
data, and does not model any failure modes, it can
potentially detect unknown failure modes. The model
takes the form of a knowledge base (KB) of clusters.
Once the KB has been learned, unseen data points are
evaluated against the KB and assigned anomaly scores
based on how anomalous the data points are with re-
spect to the training data. If a new point falls within
an existing cluster, then it is assigned an IMS score of
zero. If it does not fall within an existing cluster, then
the distance to the nearest cluster is used as the IMS
score. When an anomalous period of the testing data
is localized, the contributing IMS scores can be iden-
tified, helping to diagnose the issue. Prior to the Ares
I-X launch, we trained IMS on historical Space Shut-
tle data, and tested it using historical Shuttle data into
which we had inserted simulated failures. During the
Ares I-X pre-launch period, IMS processed live Ares
I-X data, using a knowledge base that was the result of
training IMS on historical Shuttle data. The remainder
of this section describes the selection of measurements
for use with IMS, the training and testing procedures
used, and the results obtained both on Shuttle data and
on Ares I-X data. The section concludes with a sum-
mary of the results.
4.1 Parameter Selection
For Ares I-X data to be compatible with historical
Shuttle data a common set of parameters needed to be
chosen. During the Shuttle analysis on chosen sim-
ulated faults, all continuous-valued parameters were
selected along with one discrete parameter that was
known to be critical in detecting one of the three failure
simulations, for a total of 137 parameters. The choice
of mostly using continuous parameters was made be-
cause historically IMS has performed better when op-
erating on mostly continuous sensor values. After run-
ning an analysis on the failure simulations, some false
alarms were detected and an additional set of parame-
ters were eliminated, leaving 102. For the purposes of
feature selection (parameter elimination), a false alarm
is defined qualitatively as a large excursion above an
apparent “baseline” in the composite score produced
by IMS, which characterizes the anomalousness of a
specific point in the time series. With the elimination
of these parameters the false alarms were significantly
reduced. When the first set of Ares I-X VAB data was
recorded a common subset was selected between the
Ares I-X parameter set and the 102 parameters from
the Shuttle resulting in the 33 parameters used for anal-
ysis on the Ares I-X data.
4.2 Training and Testing Procedures
For the purpose of training and testing IMS, we used
historical Space Shuttle data into which we inserted
simulated failures, with varying rates of degradation,
and spanning fixed time periods in a random fash-
ion. Although the main purpose of using IMS in the
Ground Diagnostics Prototype is to detect unknown
failures, we tested it by using simulations of known
failures. (For obvious reasons, we were unable to sim-
ulate unknown failures.) IMS has a number of tunable
input parameters, however one key parameter that was
very important to tune was the maximum interpreta-
tion (max interp) parameter. This parameter governs
the threshold in the learning phase that determines if
a new data point should be placed in the current clus-
ter or used to generate a new cluster. The parameter
directly influences the number of clusters created in
the learning phase and therefore has a major influence
in the final anomaly score calculated by IMS. As the
max interp value increases the total number of clusters
formed becomes smaller.
To determine the optimal max interp value and cor-
responding number of clusters a set of cross validation
runs was performed on a set of Shuttle VAB and pad
data, using the AUC as the governing metric for opti-
mization. Cross validation is a technique for estimat-
ing the accuracy of a machine learning algorithm, by
training and testing the algorithm multiple times, each
time using different subsets of the available data for
training and testing, and then averaging the results.
4.3 Results on Shuttle Simulations
Once the cross validation runs were complete, the ar-
eas under the ROC curves were calculated using data
that spans the time that the shuttle was still in the VAB.
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Figure 4: AUC as a function of IMS Parameter Max
Interp for Shuttle data from the VAB
Figure 5: ROCCurve for Optimal Max Interp for Shut-
tle data from the VAB
Figure 4 shows the maximum, minimum, and average
AUC over the three-fold cross validations and three
fault scenarios (listed as failure modes 1a, 2, and 3 in
Table 1) for each max interp value. The optimal max
interp value that was chosen is marked in the plots.
The mean AUC with the highest value is 0.86893, and
corresponds to the optimal max interp value of 0.13,
which can be seen in Figure 4. The ROC curve as-
sociated with this optimized max interp value can be
seen in Figure 5. The relatively modest detection per-
formance at the VAB can be attributed to the fact that
IMS had difficulty detecting simulated failure 1a. This
difficulty stemmed from the fact that the increase in
IMS score resulting from this simulated failure was
not much larger than the nominal variation in the IMS
score, so it was not possible to select a threshold that
would allow IMS to detect all of the simulated failures
without increasing the number of false alarms. Thus,
some failure modes are easily detected using IMS’
distance-based approach with clustering, while others
are not. When IMS is used in parallel with TEAMS-
RT, TEAMS-RT should detect all of the failures that
Figure 6: Ares I-X VAB Global IMS Score with False
Alarms
are modeled in the TEAMS model; the advantage of
using IMS in addition is that it has the potential to de-
tect failures that were not modeled, as well as anoma-
lies that are not yet failures. For the pad, the AUC is
0.99919, indicating that IMS does an excellent job of
detecting the two simulated failure modes 1a and 3 at
the pad, and performs much better than at the VAB. An
intuitive explanation for this discrepancy relates to the
fact that at the pad only a small portion of the data has
high “activity,” during the last minute before launch.
However, data from quiescent periods previous to the
last minute before launch are also used for analysis.
As such, this translates to a lower signal to noise ra-
tio, which directly influences the AUC, resulting in a
higher value and thus fewer false positives.
4.4 Results on Ares I-X
Once the optimal max interp parameter was deter-
mined from the Shuttle data, IMS was trained on 33
measurements using Shuttle data from seven flights,
which also represents the greatest common subset cor-
responding to equivalent Ares I-X measurements. Af-
ter building the knowledge base, the Ares I-X data was
evaluated against it, and ostensibly acts as hold out test
data from a machine learning standpoint. The resulting
IMS scores for the VAB are shown in Figure 6. With
the initial set of 33measurements, 3 periods of anoma-
lous behavior were flagged by IMS; they are labeled
as three “False Alarms” in Figure 6. We performed
an analysis of each “false alarm”; here we present the
analysis of False Alarm 1 as an example. We deter-
mined that False Alarm 1 was primarily caused by two
measurements. The contributing IMS scores for these
two measurements are plotted in Figure 7.
False Alarm 1 was caused by a difference between
the Space Shuttle and Ares I-X data. In recent years,
the TVC actuator tests performed in the VAB have all
been “pinned” tests, meaning that the actuator is phys-
ically pinned to the nozzle during testing, so that the
nozzle moves during the test. The first TVC actuator
position test performed in the VAB for Ares I-X was
an “unpinned” test, meaning that the actuator was de-
tached from the nozzle, and the nozzle did not move
during the test. Because the actuator was unpinned,
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Figure 7: VAB Top Contributing IMS Scores For False Alarm 1
it was able to move through a larger range of motion
that is not possible during pinned testing. IMS there-
fore saw rock and tilt position values that it had never
seen in the Shuttle data, which it flagged as anomalies.
These anomalies are “false alarms” in the sense that
they are not failures, but they do illustrate the ability
of IMS to detect new data that is different from what it
has seen before. We performed a similar analysis for
the pad, where there were fewer anomalies identified
by IMS. Like the anomalies detected at the VAB, the
anomalies detected at the launch pad were caused by
operational differences between Shuttle and Ares I-X.
4.5 Summary of IMS Deployment Results
The experiments that we ran before the Ares I-X
launch using historical Space Shuttle data with sim-
ulated failures demonstrated that IMS is able to de-
tect most of the simulated failures, but not all of them.
In particular, it had difficulty detecting the simulated
failure mode 1a in the VAB due to its relatively small
contribution to the overall IMS anomaly score com-
pared to the other two simulated failure modes. IMS is
not trained to detect specific failure modes; it detects
data that is anomalous according to its cluster-based
model. We expect that many known and unknown fail-
ure modes will be detected as anomalies by IMS, but it
is not guaranteed to detect all possible failure modes.
The advantage of using IMS together with a model-
based diagnosis system such as TEAMS is that it adds
the potential to detect unknown failure modes and to
detect precursors of failures.
The results of running IMS on Ares I-X data, us-
ing a knowledge base that was trained on historical
Space Shuttle data confirm our hypothesis that the
Ares I-X TVC data is reasonably similar to the Space
Shuttle SRB TVC data. Most of the time IMS pro-
duced small anomaly scores when run on the Ares I-X
data. IMS did detect some “anomalies” in the Ares I-
X data. These anomalies were “false alarms” in the
sense that they were not failures but rather caused by
operations performed differently for Ares I-X versus
Shuttle; hence, they illustrate the ability of IMS to de-
tect new data that is different from what has been seen
in the past.
5 IMS/TEAMS PERFORMANCE
COMPARISON
5.1 Anomalies Detected by IMS That Were Not
Detected by TEAMS
We have seen that IMS detected some interest-
ing anomalies that were not detected by TEAMS
because they were not failures as defined in the
FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) and the
other documents on which the TEAMS models were
based. One such anomaly was the pinned/unpinned
actuator anomaly mentioned previously. In the
pinned/unpinned anomaly there were procedural dif-
ferences between the TVC test for the Shuttle and Ares
I-X, resulting in IMS signaling an anomaly in the TVC
rock and tilt actuator positions. . This anomaly was
not a failure; hence it was detected by IMS but not by
TEAMS. Furthermore, it was found that there are other
differences between Shuttle and Ares I-X actuator tests
due to the sequence being changed slightly along with
a greater max displacement. Ostensibly, this had an
even greater effect than the pinned/unpinned variation
alone for IMS.
5.2 Failures Detected Earlier by IMS Than by
TEAMS
Table 2 summarizes the detection times for the sim-
ulated failures that were detected both by IMS and
TEAMS in minutes after injection of the failure. A hy-
pothesized advantage of IMS is that it may detect cer-
tain failures before TEAMS. However, on average the
results show that TEAMS detected failures prior to the
time that IMS did. On two occasions, IMS was able to
detect a simulated failure prior to TEAMS, as shown in
red in Table 2. In the case of failure 3, which was simu-
lated with a simple bit flip at the VAB, the detection oc-
curred at approximately the same time. The other two
failures are more complicated, and are described by
gradual ramps of continuous-valued parameters rather
than instantaneous bit flips of discrete-valued param-
eters, owing to the notable differences in detection
times. It can be seen from Table 2 that IMS sometimes
detected failures earlier than TEAMS did, but more of-
ten it detected them later. There may be some advan-
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Table 2: Summary of simulated failure detection times
Failure Flight Trial IMS Detection Time TEAMS Detection Time Difference
1a
STS-107
1 8.77 2.24 6.53
2 19.51 5.04 14.47
3 13.48 1.39 12.09
STS-112
1 217.37 2.2 215.14
2 3.27 5.04 -1.77
3 222.07 1.38 220.7
STS-120
1 0.89 2.23 -1.34
2 8.69 5.02 3.67
3 3.45 1.38 2.07
2
STS-112
1 1.76 1.5 0.26
2 4.01 2.33 1.68
3 3.78 2.4 1.38
STS-120
1 4.92 2.57 2.35
2 3.62 2.32 1.3
3 3.89 2.39 1.5
3
STS-112
1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0
STS-120
1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0
tage to running IMS in parallel with TEAMS in order
to provide earlier detection of some failures. Another
observation worth noting is that there appears to be a
wider variance for the IMS detection latencies for a
given failure simulation spanning several flights. This
lends credence to the fact that TEAMS detection times
are based purely upon logic rather than statistics, the
latter of which IMS incorporates in its detection capa-
bility.
5.3 Failures Detected By TEAMS That Were Not
Detected By IMS
IMS occasionally misses simulated failures, usually as
a function of the fine tuning required to mitigate spe-
cific instances of false alarms on test (Ares I-X) data.
This fine tuning involves varying the number of clus-
ters in the knowledgebase, the measurements (sensor
values) represented in the knowledgebase, as well as
the threshold or qualitative heuristic used following the
application of ROC analysis. Typically, ROC curves
span multiple failures, but are based only on a limited
few Shuttle flights for training data. As such, when
applying the resulting knowledge-base to unseen hold
out test (e.g. Ares I-X) data, simulated failures may
not be detected. In fact, great measures may need to
be taken in order for such failures to be detected, of-
ten at the expense of false alarms, as is apparent in the
examples of false alarms presented previously.
5.4 Failures More Appropriate For Modeling
With TEAMS
Anomaly detection methods such as IMS are not well
suited for detecting some types of failures. As men-
tioned previously, we used simulations of known fail-
ure modes to test IMS. For some of these simulated
failures, we expended a lot of effort in tuning IMS to
get IMS to detect the simulated failures. This tuning
process included reducing the set of measurements that
were used to train IMS. For failure mode 4, a simulated
failure covering a stuck actuator during a simulated
positioning test at the VAB, almost all measurements
other than the one required to simulate the failure had
to be excluded in order to provide adequate detection
capability. For this same case, a linear regression was
required in order to facilitate the construction of com-
manded position computed by proxy of a commanded
current measurement due to the absence of the requi-
site electromechanical conversion data. The difference
between the quasi-commanded position and the actual
measured position was then used as the sole parameter
with which to train and test IMS. Any additional mea-
surements included in the knowledgebase resulted in
a missed detection. This is a case in which IMS was
clearly not a good choice for detecting the particular
failure mode.
Cases such as these serve as evidence that each tool
should be leveraged to promote its strengths rather
than re-adapting the tool to solve a problem that is
outside of its domain of relevance. With IMS, we
know that its strengths lie in a great potential to detect
faults that are unknown or that otherwise have not been
modeled and to detect anomalies that are precursors of
faults before a model-based system detects the fault.
We believe that it would be better to rely on TEAMS to
detect the known failure mode described above, rather
than tuning IMS to detect it. Reducing the set of mea-
surements that are used to train IMS did allow IMS
to successfully detect the simulated failures, but it re-
duced IMS’ potential to detect other unknown failures.
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As mentioned previously, we believe including a semi-
supervised data-driven anomaly detection algorithm
such as IMS alongside a model-based diagnosis sys-
tem such as TEAMS in a diagnostic system adds sig-
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nificant value, when used appropriately. Doing so will
allow the overall anomaly detection system to be en-
dowed with the potential to detect anomalies that can-
not be detected by the model-based diagnosis system
in isolation, either because they are unknown failures
and therefore unmodeled, or because they are not fail-
ures. Furthermore, IMS may detect known failures in
advance of the time that TEAMS would detect them,
and in general IMS requires less modeling effort than
TEAMS (although it does require a sufficient quantity
of historical and/or simulated training data).
It was also important to consider the ability of IMS
to detect failures in a true operational setting, but there
was a dearth of true failures resembling those that we
simulated with which to conduct experiments. There-
fore, we hoped to demonstrate an improved ability of
IMS to detect simulated failures that may be more re-
alistic by increasing their fidelity. We have found that
for fast FSM leaks, robust detection performance im-
proves for both the high and low fidelity simulations,
and the performance for both types of simulations also
converges as the leak rate increases. However, over-
all we have also observed that there is no appreciable
difference between the effect of using a low or high
fidelity simulation on detection performance.
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